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  A common problem in agricultural credit markets in developing countries is the 
coexistence of a competitive market equilibrium interest rate and credit rationing. The 
literature typically explains the existence of credit rationing in competitive credit 
markets using adverse selection and moral hazard. Unfortunately these analyses are not 
consistent with the empirical reality that developing countries deal with in terms of 
subsidized credit, especially in the agricultural sector. This paper presents an alternative 
explanation for credit rationing in the agricultural sector in developing countries based 
on the fact that the requested loans are usually for small amounts, with many farmers 
making applications. As a result, the costs of operation increase with the number of 
loans given, so that inefficiencies in credit allocation occur when national development 
banks are present. It is shown that credit rationing can be reduced if shutting-down the 
national development bank is a feasible policy. Two other cases show that a national 
development bank is welfare-improving if an incentive compatible contract is used. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Competitive equilibrium entails market-clearing prices that eliminate any excess of 
supply or demand. In that case, there should not be any quantity rationing. It is the 
consensus to think of the interest rate as the price for loans. Then, how can we justify 
the existence of an equilibrium interest rate in the credit market and, at the same time, 
coexistence of credit rationing
1? This phenomenon has been studied by Freimer and 
Gordon (1965), Jaffee (1971), Keeton (1979), and, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) –among 
others-. Stiglitz and Weiss were the first to formally introduce agency issues such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard into the credit rationing literature.  
 
Unfortunately the agricultural credit sector in developing countries is no exception. 
Far from the information-related constraints, bank spreads in developing countries 
cause a huge gap between the returns from inefficient agricultural activities and the 
interest rate banks charge
2. In contrast, bringing information asymmetries into the 
discussion, Binswanger and Deininger in their 1997 paper comment that the adverse 
selection and hidden action problems within developing countries show their ugly faces 
not because they are “intrinsically less productive” but due to the prohibitive agency 
costs of supervision and monitoring. In addition, they argue that despite that local 
lenders may acquire information about the “creditworthiness” of their borrowers, and 
regardless of the relative little cost of the undertaken projects, their ability to 
                                                 
1 Bester (1985) defines credit rationing as “Credit rationing is said to occur when some borrowers receive 
a loan and others do not, although the latter would accept even higher interest payments or an increase in 
the collateral”. 
2 See Brock and Rojas-Suárez (2000) for a further discussion on this issue.   - 4 -
differentiate risk is limited. On the other hand, Blackman (2001) explains why lenders 
not even distinguish between financing traditional investments and give loans to adopt 
new high-return technologies. This is because of the high probability of intentional 
default due to what he calls the “lack of formality” of farmers in developing countries. 
This informality emanates from the fact that these farmers are both firms and 
households so they will finance household consumption as well. Since consumption 
yields a very high time preference rate, therefore intended default shows up. The other 
concern that increases the credit constraints in developing countries is the partial, 
limited or total lack of enforceability. Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001) discuss the 
loss of welfare when limited contract enforceability is present in a general equilibrium 
framework. They treat this credit constraint as an endogenously-generated general-
equilibrium market-incompleteness in an infinite horizon model. The model is applied 
to firms in developed countries when entrepreneurs and investments undertake long-
term relationships. 
 
Hoff and Stiglitz (1995) elaborate a theoretical approach treating the empirical fact 
that an increment in the subsidies to agricultural credit in developing countries 
aggravates the farmers’ credit conditions, stressing the role of informal credit entities. 
 
Banerjee, Besley and Guinnane (1994) propose the use of credit cooperatives in 
developing countries as a better allocation mechanism than the conventional banking 
arrangements. They use Germany’s nineteenth century cooperative framework 
methodology and provide reasons such as social sanctions, more long-term repeated   - 5 -
interactions between economic actors as a way to improve the information asymmetries 
of the credit problem in the developing countries. Unfortunately this does not seem to 
be a helpful solution at all in terms of optimal allocation of resources to develop the 
agricultural sector. Binswanger and Deininger (1997) argue that the allocation of public 
expenditures, in this case, subsidized low-interest rate credits to rural areas in 
developing countries, in hands of large farmers who are politically-active, namely, the 
cooperatives, increase inequality and reduce productivity and long-run growth. 
 
The purpose of the paper is to explain why there are problems allocating subsidized 
credit in developing countries, emphasizing the presence of an inefficient national 
development bank
3 as a source of credit rationing. This analysis applies a theoretical 
credit-rationing model that differs to the current state of the literature on credit 
rationing. The current state of the literature does a good job explaining credit rationing 
in the competitive credit market bringing up adverse selection and moral hazard as 
fundamental sources of credit rationing. They bring up issues such as interest rate floors 
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the size of the loans (Freixas and Laffont, 1990), the timing 
and observability of the agents endowments (Azariadis, 1993), and the presence of 
informal credit entities (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1995). Some others have based their work 
mainly on these four frameworks. Unfortunately, except for Hoff and Stiglitz (1995), 
they are not consistent with the well-known empirical fact that developing countries 
deal in terms of the inverse relationship between welfare and subsidized credit, 
                                                 
3 Although Bravermand and Guasch (1989) already recognize the inherent inefficiencies of the national 
development banks in developing countries, as well as their possible effects on credit rationing, they do 
not provide a formal theoretical treatment of this issue.   - 6 -
especially in the agricultural sector. Usually subsidized credit for technology involves 
interest rates lower or at least equal to the marginal product of capital, so interest rate 
need not be a powerful argument. The size of the loan is certainly not an issue because 
subsidized credit encompasses many low-amount loans. On the other hand, while 
timing of the endowments and the observable concern are important standpoints, they 
do not fully explain the credit rationing problem with subsidized credits. Despite Hoff 
and Stiglitz (1995) offer explanations that are consistent with the empirical facts of the 
subsidized credit system in developing countries, they overlook the important role of 
the presence of an inefficient national development bank in their research. As a final 
remark on this brief literature review, limited enforceability is indeed an important issue 
but, as shown by Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2001), with long-term relations this 
can be minimized. In this paper, only credit to purchase capital goods will be 
considered
4. For this reason, full enforceability will be assumed through out the paper.  
 
Fig. 1 A generic view of the international development rural credit system 
 
                                                 
4 These concerns can be dealt giving the farmers the capital good itself by reaching an agreement between 
the supplier of the capital good and the bank, instead of giving the individuals the money to buy it.   - 7 -
Figure 1 (above) shows a basic structure of how the subsidized rural credit system 
works in developing countries. International financial institutions such as the World 
Bank (WB) and other regional entities such as the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB) lend money at preferred interest rates (below the international market interest 
rate) to governments or certain decentralized national institutions
5 (relationship A). At 
this stage, the government distributes the money among the three basic identified formal 
credit channels: a national development bank, commercial banks, and cooperatives 
(relationship B). Through these three basic channels, medium and small farmers are 
supposed to have access to subsidized credit for their agricultural operations 
(relationship C). 
 
The aim of this research is to bring to the policymaker’s attention the issue that the 
presence of an inefficient national development bank and nonobservability of marginal 
costs of operation of both development and commercial banks are an important source 
of credit rationing for purchasing capital goods in developing countries. As a result, this 
paper will focus only on the formal credit sector.  
 
Cooperatives are left out of the model presented in this paper following Binswanger 
and Deininger’s (1997) argument on the negative effects in economics growth when the 
allocation of subsidized credits is in hands of the co-ops. 
 
This paper presents an alternative explanation based on the fact that these credits are 
usually many low-amount loans. Costs of operation increase with the quantity of loans 
given so the inefficiencies to allocate credit when national development banks are 
present play an important role in the subsidized credit provision. 
 
                                                 
5 In the case of Mexico, it is called Fideicomisos Instituidos en Relación con la Agricultura (FIRA). It is 
worth to mention that in this case, FIRA is not a retail bank. The rural national development bank in 
Mexico was the Banco Nacional de Crédito Rural (Banrural). Banrural was officially closed on December 
13
th, 2002 due to extreme inefficiencies. According to the international consulting firm KPMG’s audit 
report on Banrural (Ceballos, 2002), for every four pesos, only one actually reached the farmers.   - 8 -
It is shown that credit rationing can be reduced if shutting-down the national 
development bank is a feasible policy. Two more cases in which the government must 
keep the development credit entity are shown to be welfare-improving. 
 
To facilitate the presentation of this research, the paper is divided in three sections. 
In section 2, a theoretical framework to explain subsidized credit rationing based on the 
crucial assumption on how a certain number of low-amount loans are allocated and the 
intrinsic inefficiency of national development banks is presented. This model 
emphasizes that the presence of an inefficient national development bank and 
nonobservable marginal costs of operation in the overall banking industry are a major 
source of subsidized credit rationing in developing countries. 
 
Given the importance of obtaining an optimal amount of the capital loan as well as 
an optimal interest rate that should be charged to the final credit user to ensure growth, 
section 3 develops an endogenous growth model
6 of small farmers using Blackman’s 
(2001) assumption that small farmers in developing countries are both, firms and 
households at the same time. In addition, homogeneity of the farmers’ credit needs is 
also assumed. Finally, some concluding remarks are exposed in the last section. 
 
2.   A dynamic principal-agent model: The government-retail banks relationship
7 
 
This section develops a model where the existence of an inefficient national 
development bank and the nonobservability of the banks’ costs of operation are an 
important source of subsidized credit rationing for capital goods. 
 
                                                 
6 Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2003) use a similar methodology, namely, asymmetric information 
modeling techniques mixed with endogenous growth models, to assess economic growth and technology 
adoption. 
7 This model tackles relationship B in Figure 1.   - 9 -
2.1 Environment 
 
Assume an economy of  0 > N  infinitely-lived small homogeneous farmers
8, at 
every time t. A benevolent government wants to allocate a number  t I  of subsidized 
loans
9 to acquire capital goods, via two types of financial institutions: development 
banks and commercial banks. For simplicity, let’s say, there is only one entity per type 
of bank
10. Time is assumed to be discrete. 
 
The subsidized government interest rate 
G r  is defined as an interest rate lower than 
the central bank rate and/or the rate at which the banks borrow money from the public 
that takes into account the international financial institution’s interest rate, the marginal 
costs of allocation, and the economic growth situation of the small and medium farmers. 
Although it will be endogenously derived in section III, right now it is set exogenously 
by the government and it is assumed to be fixed for both types of banks
11 and for all t. 
 
The subsidized credit costs of operation is denoted by C  that is assumed to be a 
continuous, differentiable, increasing, and convex function of the number of loans  t I , 
                                                 
8  N  is a large fixed number. This implies that population growth is zero. On first sight this appears to be 
an unrealistic assumption, but according to (Binswanger and Deininger, 1997) population has not 
increased significantly in the agricultural sector in the last eighty years. This is due to the fact that 
migration from rural to urban areas has offset the population growth in the agricultural sector. 
Homogeneity among farmers in the sense of having the same amount of land, same technology, same cost 
function, and same utility function. This is still consistent with the crucial assumption that small farmers 
in developing countries are “a lot” of them needing low-amount capital loans. On the other hand, this 
setup can be also used to address issues in other segments of the economy such as non-agriculturally 
related family businesses. (The same structure, “a lot” of them with low-amount of credit needs). 
9 Since farmers are homogeneous and, therefore, have the same credit needs, allocating a certain number 
of subsidized loans instead of an aggregate loan seems to be “good” objective for the benevolent 
government. Furthermore, due to this fact, public press in the developing countries usually talks about 
number of loans instead of a certain aggregate loan goal (See Zúñiga’s, Reforma Article, 2002). 
10 This assumption makes sense since usually national development banks’ objectives in developing 
countries do not overlap, so they do not compete for clients and projects. On the other hand, commercial 
banks will show the same behavior is we assume a competitive structure, so it is rational to use a 
representative agent approach. Therefore, the commercial bank entity is the sum of a certain finite 
number of homogenous commercial banks. 
11 That is the case of Mexico, where FIRA lends to both types of banks at the same interest rate.   - 10 -
for both types
12, and linear in the given 
G r . Development banks are assumed to be a 
high-cost entity, with cost function C . According to the so-called “Meltzer Report”
13, 
many development banking operations are characterized by high cost and low 
effectiveness. Conversely, commercial banks are considered to be a low-cost subsidized 
credit allocation entity, due to the assumed competitive structure of that industry. C  
stands for the commercial bank cost function. Consequently, the total and the marginal 
costs of the less efficient entity (development bank) are strictly grater than the total and 
marginal costs of the efficient (commercial) bank for all t, i.e.  C C > , and  ′ > ′ C C , 
for every I  and I . Therefore, the total operation cost is the sum of aggregate credit 






t r I C r I C r I C ; ; ; + = .  
 
According to De Meza and Webb (2000), sometimes credit rationing does not imply 
insufficient lending. In this case, it is assumed that, if credit rationing exists, it does 
imply insufficient lending. Thus, if credit rationing occurs, the condition  N I <  is 
satisfied at every point in time
14. 
 
2.2 Government preferences 
 
The Government preferences are denoted by the loss function  t W : 
 
() ()
* ; , t t t t t L I C L W W =   () 1 
 
                                                 
12  0 . > ′ C ,  0 . > ′ ′ C  
13 This report emerged from the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission formed in 1998 
by the U.S. Congress to consider the future roles of several international financial institutions such as the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) –amongst others-, Meltzer, Allan H. (2000) 
14 This implies that the all the N  group of farmers are willing to apply for a subsidized credit at a certain 
interest rate that, for the time being, is assumed to be optimal.   - 11 -
where  t L  is the aggregate subsidized loan for both types of bank at time t,  i.e. 








i t i t L , ,   ,  t I  is the total number of loans for both types at time t, i.e.  
() () t t t t t i I i I I + = . 
*
t L  is the targeted aggregate subsidized loan. Shutting-down policy is 
ruled out: 0 > I  for both types
15, for all t. 
 
The welfare function is linear in costs of operation and quadratic in aggregate loan 
amount: 
 




, ; , ,   () 2 
where  ω  is the relative weight on costs of operation with respect to the aggregate 
subsidized loan target. 
 
Fig. 2 Government Preference Function 
                                                 
15 No shutting down policy in the commercial banks is irrelevant since under the assumptions already set 
in the model there is no need for further explanation. Thus, it is more interesting is to explain the no shut-
down policy in the development banks. If the national development bank is inefficient, welfare will be 
improved if the shutting down policy takes place, given that the competitive structure of the commercial 
bank would lead to improve welfare. The problem is that sometimes is not feasible either because of sunk 
costs or because of political reasons. Usually these institutions encompass a big bureaucratic body not 
easy to get rid off.   - 12 -
This penalty function has been commonly used by several models (Kydland and 
Prescott, 1977, Barro and Gordon, 1983, Svensson, 1997, among others
16) to represent 
the government preferences where the achievement of positive targets comes along with 
other negative outcomes that have to be reduced. In this case, this function takes into 
account the trade-off between number of loans that the government would like to give 
(as many as possible) in order to accomplish a political achievement in the agricultural 
sector, and, on the other hand, the operation (and/or allocation) costs this subsidized 
loan provision involves (that wish to be minimized). 
 
As we can see on Figure 2 (above), at a certain t, an increase in the number of loans 
up to 
* L L =  -where you reach the global minimum- reduces  t W . The left-hand side of 
the quadratic graph is not shown since governments’ money constraints in developing 





*, ; , ,
t
t t t t t
t L I C I L W ω γ , 1 0 < < γ   () 3 
 
The government minimizes () 3  choosing the current and future number of loans for 
the two types of banks, subject to a minimum-loan constraint,  t it   ≥ , for both types, 
for all  t i, . And a proportion constraint  () N Rt 1 ≤ , for both types, for all t, where  t R  
is the proportion of the (rural) population that will be positively affected by getting a 
loan, 1 0 ≤ < t R .  t R  is assumed to be constant
17 for all t. γ  is the government discount 
factor. 
                                                 
16 Blinder (1998) discusses this type of loss functions in terms of who provides the government’s 
objective function and how. Since, practically, legislative and other political authorities never give 
explicit instructions; governments must create their own social welfare function based on their legal 
directives as well as their own value judgments. 
17 We assumed that the rural population was large and fixed. Therefore, since the amount of money 
needed to affect a huge proportion of the rural population is way too large, it seems rational to assume a 
small and constant R  such that  1 lim =
∞ → t t R . It can also be seen as if the government achieved the goal of 
1 = R  in a finite time T  but then it starts again with another type of capital good. Anyway, this   - 13 -
Both constraints are needed to have a fair description of a rational benevolent 
government because, in the case of the “minimum-loan” restriction, although farmers 
are willing to apply for a low amount loan, it also has to be sufficiently enough to buy 
some piece of technology to improve the farmer’s production techniques. Let’s say, the 
quantity of money needed to buy a generic tractor
18. If we do not impose the minimum-
loan restriction then, one equilibrium would be to give infinitesimal amounts of money 
to everybody and, definitely, that would not be an adequate description of a benevolent 
policymaker’s preferences. On the other hand, if we do not impose the “proportion” 
constraint, then the optimization process would yield an equilibrium in which just one 
farmer gets the whole aggregate subsidize credit (
* L ) because that would satisfy the 
“minimum loan constraint” and also would minimize the costs of operation. 
 
Recall that we have already assumed that all farmers are homogenous. Therefore, 
since all farmers have the same needs, then everybody applies for the same amount of 
loan, which would make a binding minimum-loan constraint, i.e.  ∑ = =
I
i t i t L
1 ,  , and  
  = t i, , implies    I
I
i = ∑ =1 , for both types. On the other hand, let’s assume the 
proportion constraint is also binding
19, i.e. () R N I I = + . 
 
The subsidized loan target 
*
t L  will be exogenously determined by the government at 
every point in time
20 and is fixed for every period of time
21. These two assumptions and 
the fixed population and fixed amount of loan suppositions, imply that   N L =
* . 
 
                                                                                                                                               
assumption is relaxed at the end of section III and it yields important results in terms of the gradualism of 
openness in the agricultural sector in developing economies towards international trade. 
18 Buying better seed, fertilizer or pesticide and other input financing loans are not considered in this 
framework since the focus is on capital loans. 
19 It is rational to assume that a benevolent government wants to hit the proportion target. 
20 Later on (in section III), we will relax this assumption by obtaining an optimal amount of aggregate 
subsidized loan for every period of time using an endogenous growth model. 
21 Despite that the optimal amount of the aggregate subsidized loan is determined by an endogenous 
growth model (section 3), this assumption is still realistic since the optimal targeted subsidized aggregate 
loan is stable in time, due to the assumptions of fixed population and fixed amount of loan.   - 14 -
2.3 Banks’ participation constraints 
 
The banks’ individual rationality constraint is the banks’ profit function greater or 
equal to zero, i.e.: 
 
() ( ) 0 ; , , ≥ Π
G F
t r r I C I , for both types, for all t              () 4 
 
where  () • Π  is the bank’s profit for both types and 
F
t r  is the interest rate at which the 
loans given to the farmers are set. The banks’ profit function –namely, equation () 4-  






t ; ; , , ′ − = Π , g is 
assumed to be linear.  
The profit functions for both types of bank are: 
 




t ; ; , , ′ − = Π   () 5 








 ′ − = Π ; ; , ,  () 6 
 
The national development bank is a government non-profit organization, so it makes 
sense that  0 = Π .We have assumed a competitive configuration for the commercial 
banking sector, hence  0 = Π  is also a rational supposition. 
 
The optimal interest rate and the optimal subsidies make the bank participation 
constraint for both types binding at all times. Since 
G r ,  I , and the marginal cost 
functions are constant for both types, and for all t, it implies that 




G F r I C r ; ′ =   () 7 
   - 15 -
()
G F r I C r ; ′ =   () 8 
 
Given that  ()()
G G r I C r I C ; ; ′ > ′ , therefore 
F F r r > . Assuming that the optimal rate 
at which the farmer should get the subsidized credit equals the interest rate that the 
commercial banks charge, i.e. 
F r , the government has to give an extra subsidy 
D S  to 
the development bank so they can charge the same rate to ensure that the farmer 
receives a credit at an interest rate 
F r  equal to his/her marginal product of capital
22. 
Thus, expression () 7  becomes: 
 
()
D G F S r I C r − ′ = ; , where 
F D r S ∆ = , and 
F F F r r r − = ∆          () 7′  
 
It is important to mention that the bank calculates and gives the subsidy 
D S  once the 
distribution of the number of loans has already taken place. 
 
2.4 First-best outcome 
 
Recall that the operation cost functional forms are fixed in time. Therefore, the 
policymaker can find an optimal amount of subsidized loans in year t  as the solution to 
a simple period-by-period problem.  
 
Marginal costs of operation are assumed to be totally observable
23. The government 
or subsidized credit allocation institution solves the following static optimization 
problem
24: 
                                                 
22 An explanation of why both banks have to charge the same interest rate is given in section 3.  
23 This assumption will be relaxed in the second-best outcomes presented later in this section. 
24 Without loss of generality, we have dropped 
G r  from the banks’ cost of operation function since it is 
constant for both types and for all t and does not affect the first-order conditions, nor the second-order 
conditions.   - 16 -
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max min    () 9 
   . .t s  





  () 10  
 
Solving () 10  for I  and substituting it in() 9 , the first-order conditions are: 
 
I NR I − =   () 11  
 
() () I C I NR C ′ = − ′   () 12  
 
We know that  ′ > ′ t t C C , for all I . Therefore since  RN I I < ,,   1 0 ≤ < R , and 
0 > N , expression () 12  holds only if  I I < .  This implies that  RN I I < < . Therefore, 
in the first-best world, in which the marginal costs of operation are observable, the 
subsidized loans are distributed among development banks and commercial banks in the 
following way: the development bank or high-cost entity obtains I  identical loans of  
amount, and the commercial bank or efficient type gets I  number of   loans
25. In 
other words, the commercial bank will get a larger proportion of the feasible 
government goal –namely  NR- than the less-efficient bank. 
 
2.5 Example with explicit functional forms for the costs of operation 
 
In order to find a closed-form solution of this analytically tractable model, let’s 
assume the following functional forms for the costs of operation of the efficient entity 
                                                 
25 The second-order sufficient condition  () () 0 > − ′ ′ + ″ I RN C I C ω ω  confirms that the results is 
indeed a minimum since  0 > ω ,  0 .> ′ t C ,  0 .> ′ ′ t C ,  0 > I , and  RN I < .   - 17 -
and the development bank, respectively:  ()
2 4 1 I I r C
G + =  and  ()
2 2 1 I I r C
G + = . 
Both functions are consistent with the properties defined earlier in this section
26. 
 
The marginal costs are  () I r C
G 2 1 + = ′  and  I r C
G+ = ′ . Thus, the first-order 











=   () 14  
 
Since  1 0 ≤ < R , and  0 > N ,  I I >⇔ () () NR NR 3 1 3 2 > . 
 
As we mentioned before, we can observe in expressions () 13  and () 14  the “nice” 
result of proportions, given the assumed cost functions: The development bank obtains 
one third of the total number of credits that will be given and the efficient type gets the 
remaining two thirds. 
 
This result appears to be rational, i.e. the less-efficient bank gets less number of 
loans than the commercial bank because of their intrinsic difference in marginal costs of 
operation and the government preferences –at least in the way we have modeled them- 
comprises the number of loans target-minimize cost of credit allocation trade-off. The 
                                                 
26  C  is a continuous, differentiable, increasing, and convex function of I , and  ′ > ′ C C , for both 
types. Also  ′ > ′ C C , for every I  and I . 







 ″ + ′ ′ ω ω C C , since 
0 > ω .   - 18 -
next section will handle the problem when retail agricultural credit allocation marginal 
costs become unobservable. 
 
2.6 Second-best world 
 
Despite that the central bank and (or) other organizations closely monitor domestic 
commercial banking activity, nonobservability of the marginal costs of operation in this 
type of banks is a realistic assumption since it is usually an irrelevant monitoring issue 
because it is left to banking entity’s profit maximization competitive structure. 
 
The problem is that due the nonobservability of marginal costs of operation, 
commercial banks will have incentives to mimic the development banks behavior in 
order to obtain abnormal rents. This generates inefficiencies in terms of either higher 
interest rates or larger government subsidies, both worsening the credit rationing 
problem at the retail banking-farmer relationship level (relationship C in Figure 1). 
 
Here we are left with three options: One is to shut-down the development bank, so 
once this is done, the competitive structure of the commercial banks will reduce interest 
rates eliminating the low-cost entities’ incentive to mimic the high-cost behavior, 
getting rid of the inefficiencies arising from that informational problem. This will also 
reduce the government’s total subsidy
28 to agricultural credit, by (eventually) removing 
the subvention that was destined to reduce the (implicit) gap between the low-cost and 
the high-cost entities potential interest rate, i.e.  0 =
D S .  
 
Another choice is to rule-out the possibility of closing the national development 
bank because of the government political constraints due to the usually large 
bureaucratic body, and follow the “Meltzer Report” (2000) recommendation to 
transform the development bank from capital-intensive lenders into sources of technical 
assistance. It has the same effect as shutting the national development bank down in   - 19 -
terms of giving credits, but  perhaps more feasible since you don’t have to get rid of all 
the bureaucratic body in full and you can get advantage of the knowledge it has gained 
through its years in the market. 
 
A third option is to develop an optimal contract in the case where we need to leave the 
development bank running. This option could be feasible because of sunk costs and 
political constraints
29. Heterogeneity of farmers could be introduced assuming that the 
development bank is less risk-averse than the commercial banks. This option makes 
sense if we think of the development bank as the one who takes the most risky projects. 
In other words, the inefficiencies could be derived from the fact that they would be 
willing to take individuals -farmers- that could not qualify for a commercial bank 
subsidized credit. However, this is left to be developed in the future. 
 
3.  Endogenous determination of the optimal amount of loan and interest rate to 
ensure economic growth 
 
So far the model has two major weaknesses. The determination of the optimal interest 
rate and the optimal amount of the loan have been left to be exogenous. On the other 
hand, the question of the welfare effect of an increase in the number of credits remains 
unanswered. In this section, a simple dynamic growth model is presented in order to 
derive those two important components of the model in an endogenous fashion.  
 
Assume that we continue to be in an economy of  0 > N  infinitely-lived small 
homogeneous farmers, at every time t. However, in this case, we will model the 
farmer’s preferences. 
Usually, neoclassical growth models such as Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), Koopmans 
(1965) among others, are criticized in several ways. First, because they assume that the 
                                                                                                                                               
28 As it is presented in section 3, we are still advocates of a subsidy to the interest rate gap between the 
actual marginal product of capital and the one that is needed to achieve growth. 
29 Usually these rural national development banks are product of a “legacy effect”. These banks have a 
long-history and are usually a major source for jobs, making this decision to be too unpopular for the 
government in charge.   - 20 -
representative agent is immortal. However this assumption has become unimportant due 
to Samuelson’s work on life-cycle theory
30. The second supposition is to have sufficient 
homogeneity among the agents such that a representative agent can be used in the 
targeted market. In several cases this is quite an unrealistic assumption, but following 
the empirical facts in the developing countries, small and medium farmers are quite 
homogenous in terms of their credit needs –a low-amount loan to buy a capital good 
that they do not own-, it seems to be a feasible assumption. Third, another notion that is 
criticized in the co called Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans endogenous growth model is that 
individuals are supposed to be household and firms at the same time. As it was argued 
by Blackman (2001), empirically, small farmers are indeed both, making this 
assumption a credible one. 
 
3.1 The dynamic growth model 
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where  β  is the discount factor,  t x  is the representative agent –farmer- at time t, the 
individual’s preferences are represented by a standard, increasing and concave function 
of consumption  () t x u .  k  is the capital input  and δ its depreciation rate that it is 
assumed to be constant ( 1 0 ≤ ≤ δ ). The wage rate is denoted by  t w .  () k f  is the 
standard increasing and concave production function of the capital input. Its derivative 
with respect to capital is the marginal product of capital. 
                                                 
30 Samuelson (1975).   - 21 -
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This system of difference equations can be represented by the phase diagram in 
Figure 3. 
SS k  and 
SS x  are the levels of capital and consumption –respectively- at the 
steady-state of the dynamic system. 
 
 
Fig. 3 Phase diagram emphasizing the steady-state (point A) 
                                                 
31 The optimization process as well as other details can be seen in several macroeconomic textbooks. 
Azariadis’ (1993) version was used here.   - 22 -
 
Let’s assume a minimum level of subsistence consumption 
SS x x <  for all t, and a 
minimum loan amount  MIN k  for all t, that would be the minimum amount of capital 
that can lead them to the steady-state (Point  A in Figure 3) via the saddle path.  
 
Since  N L  =
*  and  is generated by an endogenous growth model, i.e.  MIN k =  , 
then the target could be feasible and manageable and predictable with a right calibration 
of the model for the specific country and the targeted agricultural sector. 
 
The interest rate at the steady-state is the marginal product of capital and it is fixed 
at  ( ) δ ρ + = ′
ss k f . However, below the steady-state, the interest rate is below the sum 
of the time-preference rate and the depreciation rate, like in the case of  MIN k ,  i.e. 




Fig. 4 Steady state, subsistence consumption, and optimal loan amount   - 23 -
As we can observe in Figure 4, individuals consume the minimum level of 
subsistence  x  either if they do not get the loan (i.e. with no capital) –point B - or if 
they get the loan, e.g. at points C ,  D, and E  -just to mention some-. The important 
issue here is that is the minimum amount of loan is not equal to  MIN k  -point C - they 
will take a divergent trajectory within the governing dynamics of the model, like, for 
example, if the loans amount stands for points D or E . Despite point E  is not likely to 
happen since it will require to give a larger loan than it is supposedly needed. On the 
other hand, it is not compatible with the credit constraints that developing countries 
governments meet. Therefore, it is important to emphasize the relevance of giving the 
right (optimal) amount of loan  MIN k =  , at the right (optimal) interest rate 
() δ ρ + < ′ min k f . 
 
3.2 Welfare implications 
 
So far the model predicts that, regardless of the amount of the loans and the number 
of credits, if credit allocation marginal costs are not observed by the government 
(agent), shutting down the national development bank credit operations (if possible) is 
welfare improving since, given the competitive structure of commercial banks, this 
action will eliminate their incentives to mimic the high-cost entity, and therefore, reduce 
the inefficiencies coming from this source. 
 
However, the question on whether an increase in the number of credits will be also 
welfare improving has not been yet answered. This is where both models the principal-
agent model (from section 2), and the endogenous growth model are mixed together. In 
order to illustrate the welfare implications of an increment in the number of loans, two 
alternatives are considered: when the minimum-loan restriction is met, and the loan is 
set equal to the optimal amount of capital  MIN k , given the degree of subsistence 
consumption  x ; in contrast when the loan is set equal to an amount  0 k , less than  MIN k .  
   - 24 -
  In the first case where  MIN k =  , the minimum-loan constraint becomes   
MIN
I
i Ik = ∑ =1 . Therefore, the loss function will be minimized for all t and the 
agricultural sector will be benefited period by period, as more rural population is taken 
into consideration by this subsidized credit program. Moreover, expanding the 
proportion constraint namely, increasing the number of credits will raise the speed of 
convergence to the steady-state.  
 
  On the other hand, in the second case where  MIN k <  , since the marginal product of 
capital, an important component to set the optimal subsidized interest rate
32, is a 
function of the level of capital, and not a function of the loan amount
33, the depletion of 
capital due to a temporal increase in consumption over the subsistence level, will 
increase the interest rate, raising the government needed subsidy and magnifying the 
loss function. At the same time, also worsens the agricultural credit rationing problem. 
Figure 5 (below) is intended to present a more intuitive approach of these results. 
 
A        B  
 
Fig. 5 Dynamic paths of capital and consumption given   MIN k =   in A and  MIN k <   in B 
 
                                                 
32  ( ) δ ρ + < < ′
SS k k f ,  () 0 < • ′ f  
33 The optimal interest rate becomes a function of the loan amount only at time  0 = t  when the 
agricultural policy is performed.   - 25 -
  The disbursement of the loan given to a representative farmer is represented as a 
discrete change in capital k  in Figure 5. These graphs also illustrate the paths of capital 
and consumption through time, given the outflow of an optimal loan, i.e. the first case, 
MIN k =  , on the left (A), and a less than optimal loan  MIN k <    on the right (B), 
regardless the number of credits given. 
 
  As we can observe, the model predicts that if the loan is less than  MIN k  welfare will 
actually decrease no matter how many credits are provided by the government or the 
retail banking entities. Furthermore, increasing the number of loans will augment the 
speed of convergence to the initial equilibrium with zero capital and subsistence 
consumption. In other words,  MIN k <   creates a poverty trap. On the other hand, if we 
add farmers’ reputation –not formally considered in this model- this could also worsen 
the credit situation of the farmers since this circumstance will be taken as a bad record. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
 
Literature on credit rationing performs a poor job explaining the coexistence of an 
equilibrium interest rate and credit rationing in the subsidized credit market, because it 
fails to take into account the major sources of this problem in developing countries. 
This paper presents an alternative explanation emphasizing that the presence of an 
inefficient national development bank and nonobservable marginal costs of operation in 
the overall banking industry are a major source of subsidized credit rationing. The 
model is based on the fact that these credits are usually many low-amount loans. Costs 
of operation increase with the quantity of loans given so the inefficiencies to allocate 
credit when national development banks are present play an important role in the 
subsidized credit provision.  
 
Assuming observability of the banks’ marginal operation costs yields a first-best 
outcome. Unfortunately, despite that the central bank and (or) other organizations 
closely monitor domestic commercial banking activity, nonobservability of the marginal   - 26 -
costs of operation in this type of banks is a realistic assumption since it is usually an 
irrelevant monitoring issue because it is left to banking entity’s profit maximization 
competitive structure. 
 
The problem is that due the nonobservability of marginal costs of operation, 
commercial banks will have incentives to mimic the development banks behavior in 
order to get abnormal profits.  
 
It is shown that credit rationing can be reduced if shutting-down the national 
development bank is a feasible policy. Two more cases in which the government must 
keep the development credit entity are shown to be welfare-improving. 
 
One option is to shut-down the development bank, so once this is done, the 
competitive structure will pull prices down plus the government will stop subsidizing 
the development bank interest rate. But we have already ruled-out this possibility 
because of the government political constraints due to the usually large bureaucratic 
body. A second choice is to follow the “Meltzer Report” (2000) recommendation to 
transform the development bank from capital-intensive lenders into sources of technical 
assistance. It has the same effect as shutting the national development bank down in 
terms of giving credits, but  perhaps more feasible since you don’t have to get rid of all 
the bureaucratic body in full and you can get advantage of the knowledge it has gained 
through its years in the market. Another way to go that is not developed in this paper is 
to create an optimal contract in the case where we need to leave the development bank 
running, our explanation of why this option could be feasible is because of sunk costs 
and political issues. 
 
In order to show the welfare effects of an increase in the number of credits, two 
scenarios were considered: a case where the minimum-loan restriction is met, and the 
loan is set equal to the optimal amount of capital, given the degree of subsistence   - 27 -
consumption, in contrast when the loan is set equal to an amount less than this optimal 
amount of capital. 
 
  In the former case, the loss function is minimized for all t and the agricultural 
sector is benefited period by period, as more rural population is taken into consideration 
by this subsidized credit program and increasing the number of credits, increases the 
speed of convergence to the desired steady-state. On the latter, since the marginal 
product of capital is a function of the level of capital, and not a function of the loan 
amount at all times, the depletion of capital due to a temporal increase in consumption 
over the subsistence level by the farmer, brings up the interest rate, raising the 
government needed subsidy and magnifying the loss function. This worsens the 
agricultural credit rationing problem since the agricultural policy effect is reduced and 
leaving farmers out of the set of recipients of subsidized credit whereas other farmers, 
with the same characteristics, with some non-optimal subsidized credit. Thus, the model 
predicts that if the loan is less than the optimal amount of loan set by the crossing-point 
where the subsistence consumption meets the saddle path of the endogenous growth 
model, welfare actually decreases, regardless on how many credits are provided by the 
government or the retail banking entities. Furthermore, increasing the number of loans 
will augment the speed of convergence to the initial equilibrium with zero capital and 
subsistence consumption, creating a poverty trap. Intuitively speaking, if we allow 
farmers’ reputation issues –not formally considered in this model- could also worsen the 
credit situation of the farmers since this circumstance will be taken as a bad record. 
 
In term of future research, a calibrated model for and simulation for some 
developing countries and an investigation of the role of R  in the gradualism towards 
international trade issue could be considered as another extension to the present 
research work. 
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